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LESSON UNLEARNED?: REGULATORY REFORM AND 
FINANCIAL STABILITY IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 
John Crawford∗  
INTRODUCTION 
A central lesson of the financial crisis of 2007–2008 was that firms 
behaving like banks should be regulated like banks. Nonbanks that 
perform the same economic function as banks—so-called “shadow 
banks”—create the same risks and demand the same regulatory response 
as depository institutions with bank charters.1 The principal legislative 
reform passed in the wake of the crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act,2 made 
several important, albeit incomplete, advances in applying elements of 
the banking regulatory regime to shadow banks. These achievements are 
now at risk, as President Trump has promised to “do a big number on 
Dodd-Frank.”3 In what has been interpreted as a first salvo in the effort to 
dismantle Dodd-Frank,4 he issued an executive order directing the 
Secretary of the Treasury to conduct a wholesale review of the current 
financial regulatory landscape.5 While executive and agency action can 
                                                                                                                           
 ∗. Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law. I am 
grateful to Abe Cable, Scott Dodson, Randy Guynn, Dave Owen, and Andrew Tuch for 
helpful comments. 
 1. As discussed in more detail below, the term “shadow banking” refers in this Piece 
not to unregulated financial activities writ large but rather to one specific activity: funding 
a portfolio of financial assets with lots of short-term debt. See infra note 36 and 
accompanying text. For an excellent account of the different legal entities that have been 
defined as “banks” under the Bank Holding Company Act, see generally Saule T. Omarova 
& Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding 
Company Regulation in the United States, 31 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 113 (2011). 
 2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 3. Glenn Thrush, Trump Vows to Dismantle Dodd-Frank “Disaster,” N.Y. Times (Jan. 30, 
2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/trump-dodd-frank-regulations.html 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 4. See, e.g., Michael C. Bender & Damian Paletta, Donald Trump Plans to Undo 
Dodd-Frank Law, Fiduciary Rule, Wall St. J. (Feb. 3, 2017), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-moves-to-undo-dodd-frank-law-1486101602 (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
 5. Exec. Order No. 13,772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 8, 2017). The Executive Order 
lays out six prima facie unobjectionable principles, such as “empower[ing] Americans to 
make independent financial decisions and informed choices in the marketplace,” 
“advanc[ing] American interests in international financial regulatory negotiations and 
meetings,” and directing the Treasury Secretary to review current laws and regulations to 
see if they conform to these principles. Id. 
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roll back some of Dodd-Frank’s reforms, durable structural reversals will 
require legislation.6 The precise contours of such legislation are hard to 
predict, but most commentators believe the best starting point for 
considering what it might look like is the Financial CHOICE Act7 
(CHOICE Act) sponsored by Representative Jeb Hensarling, chairman of 
the House Committee on Financial Services.8 This Piece argues that 
several key provisions from the CHOICE Act evince a fundamental 
conceptual mistake that threatens to undermine the financial stability of 
the United States.9 It is important to articulate this argument now so that 
it can inform the debate prior to the enactment of any new law, rather 
                                                                                                                           
 6. In addition to the fact that policy can be reversed again under a future 
administration, most financial regulatory agencies are independent and can occasionally 
prove refractory under White House pressure. See, e.g., Damian Paletta & Deborah 
Solomon, Geithner Vents at Regulators as Overhaul Stumbles, Wall St. J. (Aug. 4, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB124934399007303077 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (describing tensions between the Treasury Secretary and various agency heads 
over the direction of reform in 2009). 
 7. CHOICE is an acronym for Creating Hope and Opportunity for Investors, 
Consumers and Entrepreneurs. See U.S. House of Representatives Fin. Servs. Comm., 
The Financial CHOICE Act, Executive Summary, http://financialservices.house.gov/ 
uploadedfiles/financial_choice_act-_executive_summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/PNK5-LFT7] 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2017); see also Financial CHOICE Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th 
Cong. (2016). 
A revised version of the CHOICE Act was released on April 19, 2017. See Discussion 
Draft of the Financial Choice Act, H.R. __, 115th Cong. (2017), http://financial 
services.house.gov/uploadedfiles/choice_2.0_discussion_draft.pdf [http://perma.cc/HR9F-
AFLL]. The key provisions discussed in this Piece remain substantively unchanged in the 
new version of the Act. 
 8. See, e.g., Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, The Trump Transition and Possible 
Directions for Financial Regulatory Reform 1 (Nov. 17, 2016), 
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/2016-11-17-trump-transition-financial-
choice-act-only-the-beginning.pdf [http://perma.cc/4R4M-W34D] (identifying the 
CHOICE Act as “a starting point that signals a potential general direction of travel for 
financial reform”); Debevoise & Plimpton, The Outlook for Financial Regulatory Reform 
Under President Trump 2 (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.debevoise.com/~/ 
media/files/insights/publications/2016/11/20161130b_the_outlook_for_financial_regul
atory_reform_under_president_trump.pdf [http://perma.cc/GN4B-AGAN] (explaining 
the CHOICE Act as “a blueprint for the types of [financial] reforms that a Republican-
controlled House and Senate may pursue”); Ryan Tracy, How a Financial Council 
Republicans Loathe Could Work in Their Favor, Wall St. J. (Jan. 17, 2017), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/how-a-financial-council-republicans-loath-could-work-in-their-favor-
1484581368 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Tracy, A Financial Council 
Republicans Loathe] (stating that Representative Hensarling’s bill “is expected to serve as 
a starting point for a debate on changing Dodd-Frank this year”). 
 9. The analysis is consistent with the patriotism and good faith of the provisions’ 
sponsors. The error is conceptual and not (necessarily) born of conflict or misaligned 
incentives. It is important to emphasize, as well, that the focus of this Piece is on provisions 
that most directly implicate financial stability. There are many other provisions of the 
CHOICE Act—for example, relating to an overhaul of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau—that, whether good or bad based on other criteria, are unlikely to have a 
significant effect on financial stability. These (many) other provisions are excluded from 
the Piece’s analysis. 
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than merely critique the law ex post. The mistake boils down to a failure 
to grasp the functional equivalence of banks and shadow banks. This 
leads to a failure to appreciate the negative externalities that shadow 
banks can create—externalities that are devastating when they 
materialize and are impervious to market solutions.10 
This Piece explains the nature of banks and the regulatory response 
they demand, and why shadow banks require a similar response. 
Understanding the function and risks posed by shadow banks then serves 
as a touchstone for critiquing key elements of the CHOICE Act. The 
Piece argues that the provisions reveal a misguided belief that market 
discipline is the key to financial stability.11 Alas, the banking model, by its 
very nature, is rife with market failures that demand a unique regulatory 
response. Early indications are that when it comes to financial stability, 
the new Administration and Congress will move in the wrong direction. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Banks: The Problem and the Solution 
Banks bring enormous economic benefits12 but pose singular risks as 
well. The principal risk is that depositors will “run,” deciding to withdraw 
their money en masse.13 The problem with this is that banks do not keep 
deposits in a vault.14 A run can lead a bank to suspend redemptions or to 
                                                                                                                           
 10. The arguments about shadow banking and the response it demands are well 
established, if not universally understood or embraced. See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, The 
Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation 2 (2016) [hereinafter Ricks, The Money 
Problem] (arguing shadow banking was “at the center of the recent financial crisis”); 
Volcker All., Unfinished Business: Banking in the Shadows 9–12 (2016) [hereinafter 
Volcker Alliance Report], http://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/ 
VolckerAlliance_UnfinishedBusinessBankingInTheShadows.pdf [http://perma.cc/7LKE-
DUT7] (noting that “the risk of busts and bailouts remains all too real” due to the 
operation of shadow banks and offering policy solutions). It is important, however, to 
apply them specifically to the most objectionable reforms under consideration. 
 11. To be clear, nothing in this analysis is inconsistent with the notion that market 
discipline is essential to a functioning capitalist economy broadly conceived, nor with the 
(clearly correct) view that it can play an important, albeit limited, role in bank regulation. 
See generally John Crawford, Credible Losers: A Regulatory Design for Market Discipline, 
54 Am. Bus. L.J. 107 (2017) [hereinafter Crawford, Credible Losers] (describing 
mechanisms through which market discipline works and presenting a framework for 
establishing discipline for systemically important financial institutions). 
 12. Banks not only serve a valuable credit-intermediation role—it is more efficient for 
the bank to channel deposits to creditworthy consumers and businesses than it would be 
for depositors to try to make loans directly—but they also provide depositors with an 
efficient technology for storing and then employing resources for near-term transactional 
purposes. See, e.g., Richard Scott Carnell et al., The Law of Banking and Financial 
Institutions 39–43 (5th ed. 2013). 
 13. George G. Kaufman, Bank Runs, Libr. Econ. & Liberty, http://www.econlib.org/ 
library/Enc/BankRuns.html [http://perma.cc/CNQ2-LKUF] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
 14. As George Bailey (played by Jimmy Stewart) staves off a run in the classic movie 
It’s a Wonderful Life, he explains to his bank customers: 
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engage in fire sales of assets, both of which can have deeply pernicious 
knock-on effects.15 Furthermore, a run on one bank often triggers 
contagious runs on sister banks.16 A “panic” ensues if there are 
widespread runs on banks. Panics and the negative externalities they 
spawn constitute the essence of a financial crisis.17 Indeed, an asset 
bubble bursting is generally not “systemic” unless it triggers such runs. 
For example, the decline in stock market wealth after the dot-com crash 
was as great as the decline in housing wealth during the recent crisis and 
recession, but because the dot-com crash did not trigger a financial 
crisis—that is, widespread runs—it was comparatively benign.18 The 
                                                                                                                           
[Y]ou . . . you . . . you’re thinking of this place all wrong. As if I had the 
money back in a safe. The, the money’s not here. Well, your money’s in 
Joe’s house . . . . That’s right next to yours. And in the Kennedy house, 
and in Mrs. Macklin’s house, and in a hundred others. 
It’s a Wonderful Life (Liberty Films, Inc. 1946). 
 15. If depositors lose immediate access to their money, it may lead to consequential 
losses: “opportunity costs, operational disruption, reputational damage, or even default.” 
Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 75, 83 
(2012) [hereinafter Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis]. On the other 
hand, if the bank tries to raise cash quickly in order to meet redemption demands by 
selling relatively illiquid assets (such as mortgages), it will often have to accept a price 
below the assets’ “fundamental value.” This is a fire sale. Fire sales can have extremely 
pernicious knock-on effects. See, e.g., Anil K. Kashyap et al., Rethinking Capital 
Regulation, in Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System 431, 440–42 (2008), 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/sympos/2008/kashyaprajanstein03
1209.pdf [http://perma.cc/BMF4-8JME]. Furthermore, to the degree the banks facing or 
even fearing a run will hoard their liquid assets, it can have a serious negative effect on 
new lending, thus depressing economic activity. See id. at 442. 
 16. This “contagion by simile” describes, for example, what happened to the money 
market fund industry after the failure of Reserve Primary in September 2008. See Fin. 
Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 353–56 (2011), http:// 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [http://perma.cc/KD9Z-FUK7]. 
As described below, money market funds meet the functional definition of “bank.” See 
infra note 40. 
 17. See Ricks, The Money Problem, supra note 10, at 102 (“[I]nsofar as financial 
stability is about avoiding macroeconomic disasters, it should concern itself mostly with 
panic-proofing.”); Timothy F. Geithner, Are We Safe Yet? How to Manage Financial Crises, 
Foreign Aff., Jan./Feb. 2017, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-
12-12/are-we-safe-yet [http://perma.cc/PC3M-A3B4] [hereinafter Geithner, Are We Safe 
Yet?] (“It’s important to understand why financial systems are so vulnerable to crises. First, 
and most important, they are inherently prone to panics and runs.”).  
 18. See, e.g., John H. Cochrane, Lessons from the Financial Crisis, Regulation, 
Winter 2009–2010, at 34, 34, http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/ 
papers/cochrane_lessons_regulation.pdf [http://perma.cc/DU6G-FEZJ] (“The signature 
event of [the 2008] financial crisis was the ‘run,’ ‘panic,’ [or] ‘flight to quality’ . . . . If that 
panic had not occurred, it is likely that any economic contraction following the housing 
bust would have been no worse than the mild 2001 recession that followed the dot-com 
bust.”); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Some 
Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy Response (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120413a.htm 
[http://perma.cc/NU82-VKFY] (comparing the housing crash to the dot-com crash and 
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damage to the real economy that the financial crisis of 2008 wrought has 
been severe and enduring.19 
The American banking system suffered many similarly destabilizing, 
and often devastating, financial crises in the nineteenth and early- 
twentieth centuries.20 The problem of such crises was largely “solved” by 
the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 
1933.21 With the introduction of deposit insurance to protect depositors’ 
principal, along with a special resolution regime to ensure depositors 
could access their money without delay,22 the incentive to run was 
removed. The “moral hazard” that arose with deposit insurance23 was 
                                                                                                                           
arguing that the principal difference lay in the fact that the former was partly caused by 
the role of shadow banks while the latter was not). 
 19. See, e.g., Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Recovery from Financial 
Crises: Evidence from 100 Episodes, 104 Am. Econ. Rev. 50, 54 (2014) (noting the post-
2007 crisis was “one of the most severe multi-year crises on record in the advanced 
economies”); Martin Wolf, The Long and Painful Journey to World Disorder, Fin. Times 
(Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.ft.com/content/ef13e61a-ccec-11e6-b8ce-b9c03770f8b1 (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining how the financial crisis and subsequent 
Eurozone crisis “had devastating economic effects: a sudden jump in unemployment 
followed by relatively weak recoveries” and noting that the “economies of the advanced 
countries are roughly a sixth smaller today than they would have been if pre-crisis trends 
had continued”). 
 20. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis 9–10 
(2013) (identifying six banking panics between 1873 and 1914); Gary B. Gorton, 
Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming 29 (2012) (quoting 
a commentator’s claim in 1899 that “[s]ince 1793 panics have occurred [in the United 
States] in the following years: 1797, 1811, 1813, 1816, 1819, 1825, 1837, 1847, 1857, 1866, 
1873, 1884, 1890, and 1893”); Geithner, Are We Safe Yet?, supra note 17 (“In the five or so 
decades before the Great Depression, U.S. banks possessed much higher levels of capital, 
and yet the United States still experienced an appalling number of enormously damaging 
banking panics.”). 
 21. It is important to note that the savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s did not 
involve a panic, precisely because the institutions in question had deposit insurance. The 
S&L crisis laid bare some significant flaws in the implementation of bank regulation—
flaws that were at least partially addressed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991. See, e.g., Richard Scott Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse 
Incentives: The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, 12 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 317, 325 (1993). 
Importantly, however, unlike panics, “the savings and loan debacle was not accompanied by 
a severe macroeconomic disaster . . . [but only] a mild and brief recession.” Morgan Ricks, 
Safety First? The Deceptive Allure of Full Reserve Banking, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. Online 113, 
121 (2016) [hereinafter Ricks, Safety First?], http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview. 
uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Dialogue/Ricks_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/J74F-S7JX]. 
 22. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f)(1) (2012). 
 23. Moral hazard refers to the fact that those who are insured against a bad outcome 
may take less care in avoiding that outcome. In this context, private actors—depositors 
and bank shareholders and executives—will not bear the full costs of a bank failure and so 
may not take as much care as they should to avoid this outcome, particularly since 
strategies that lead to higher profits in good states of the world increase the likelihood of 
failure in bad states of the world. See Carnell et al., supra note 12, at 282–83. Risky 
corporate bonds, for example, pay a higher yield than Treasuries but are also likelier to 
default. See Moody’s Inv’r Serv., Corporate Default and Recovery Rates 1920–2010 (2011), 
http://efinance.org.cn/cn/FEben/Corporate%20Default%20and%20Recovery%20Rates, 
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addressed primarily by intrusive supervision, capital requirements, and 
portfolio and activity constraints.24 The system worked: It led to an 
extended “Quiet Period” of financial stability that coincided with robust 
growth and a moderation in the business cycle.25 
B.  Two Approaches to Financial Regulation 
The regulatory approach just described combines a safety net with 
risk constraints and intrusive supervision to “solve” the problem of 
banks. It is important to distinguish this “banking regulatory approach” 
from what this Piece will refer to as the “capital markets” approach to 
regulation.26 The banking regulatory approach, sometimes referred to as 
prudential regulation, or “safety and soundness” regulation, is dis-
tinguished by three features: (i) an emphasis on protecting the principal 
of a certain class of creditors—namely, depositors; (ii) an emphasis on 
preventing institutional failure;27 and (iii) a special resolution regime to 
prevent systemic spillovers in the event a bank does fail.28 This char-
acterizes the regulatory approach of the so-called banking regulators, 
including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, and 
the Federal Reserve. 
The “capital markets” approach, in contrast, characterizes trad-
itional regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).29 
                                                                                                                           
1920-2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/89QJ-UWX9] (providing historical corporate bond 
default rates); Donald Marron, The Day the United States Defaulted on Treasury Bills, 
Forbes (May 26, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2011/05/26/the-day-the-
united-states-defaulted-on-treasury-bills/#2f2d9bac30ad (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (explaining that contrary to popular belief that the United States government has 
never defaulted on its obligations, it has done so once in 1979); Tracking Bond 
Benchmarks, Wall St. J.: Mkt. Data Ctr., http://online.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3022-
bondbnchmrk.html [http://perma.cc/42CM-KFGB] (last visited Mar. 29, 2017) 
(providing information on yields for different debt instruments).  
 24. Lending by the Federal Reserve also played an important role for solvent banks 
facing temporary liquidity problems. For a good overview of this overarching regulatory 
approach, see Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, supra note 15, at 103. 
 25. See Gary B. Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007, at 11 
(2010). 
 26. See, e.g., John Crawford, The Moral Hazard Paradox of Financial Safety Nets, 25 
Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 95, 113 n.86 (2015) [hereinafter Crawford, The Moral Hazard 
Paradox]. 
 27. This informs the various risk constraints imposed on banks, as well as emergency 
lending. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (examining regulatory reaction to the 
2007 financial crisis). 
 28. See generally FDIC, Resolutions Handbook (2014), http://www.fdic.gov/about/ 
freedom/drr_handbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/D8AV-VM6F]. FDIC resolution prevents 
contagion from a bank failure in ways the existing Bankruptcy Code cannot. See, e.g., 
Crawford, Credible Losers, supra note 11, at 135–36. 
 29. See, e.g., What We Do, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [http:// 
perma.cc/XH6G-FQ8P] (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (“The mission of the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”). 
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The SEC regulates a wide variety of nondepository financial institutions, 
including the classic Wall Street securities firms, sometimes referred to as 
“broker-dealers,”30 that specialize in activities such as underwriting 
securities offerings, “market-making,”31 offering advisory services, and 
arranging financing for corporate mergers and takeovers. The SEC has 
traditionally focused on preventing fraud and manipulation in securities 
markets; its focus has not been on preventing particular firms’ failure.32 
Likewise, while it tries to protect investors from fraud,33 it does not try to 
prevent informed risk-taking or to protect investors from principal losses 
when their bets turn out badly. This approach is much less prescriptive 
and intrusive than the banking approach and seeks to harness rather 
than supplant market forces. 
The capital markets approach is appropriate when a firm’s failure 
and investors’ losses do not create significant negative externalities—
which is generally the case when firms do not fund their activities with 
deposits or other short-term borrowings that function as deposit equiv-
alents. Firms that do not fund themselves this way are generally not 
susceptible to runs and therefore do not pose the threat to financial 
stability that banks do.34 Importantly, these distinctions are functional; 
they turn on the risk different institutions create, which in turn derives 
from the activities in which those firms engage. They do not depend on 
legal forms or labels. 
                                                                                                                           
 30. Confusingly, the largest of such firms are also sometimes referred to as 
“investment banks”—but they are not banks as it has been understood in this Piece. The 
term “broker-dealer” encompasses a broader universe of firms than just the large Wall 
Street investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, but the Piece uses 
the term because it maps onto the terminology of SEC regulation and avoids confusion 
with the other definitions of “bank.” See, e.g., Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, SEC 
(Apr. 2008), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm [http://perma.cc/ 
C3L5-KYAH]. 
 31. A “market maker” is “a firm that stands ready to buy and sell a particular stock on 
a regular and continuous basis at a publicly quoted price.” Fast Answers: Market Maker, 
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mktmaker.htm [http://perma.cc/X3VZ-B4NE] (last 
modified Mar. 17, 2000). 
 32. While preventing individual firm failure has not traditionally been the SEC’s 
focus, there are nevertheless several rules that the SEC applies to broker-dealers that have 
a weak prudential flavor to them, most prominently a “net capital” rule, which serves as a 
(very) rough analogue to bank capital and reserve requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 
(2016). 
 33. The SEC seeks to deter fraud directly through its enforcement arm. See generally 
Division of Enforcement, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/enforce [http://perma.cc/K3NP-
DRJA] (last updated Apr. 14, 2015). It also oversees the Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation (SIPC), which insures brokerage customers against loss or theft of their cash 
or securities after the failure of a broker-dealer—but not against decline in value due to 
market movements. See What SIPC Protects, Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., http://www.sipc.org/for-
investors/what-sipc-protects [http://perma.cc/B69G-CMU8] (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
 34. It is worth noting that there are other sources of run-like dynamics that may call 
for more intrusive regulation, such as the collateral calls AIG faced in September 2008. 
See Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, supra note 16, at 344–45. 
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C.  Shadow Banks and the Crisis 
Although nonbanks cannot issue deposits, it turns out that they can 
issue short-term debt that serves as the functional equivalent of 
deposits,35 using the money thus raised to fund investments in long-term 
assets. Entities that engage in this bank-like function outside the 
regulatory framework and safety net that apply to banks are so-called 
shadow banks.36 Regulating shadow banks under a capital markets 
approach is a recipe for crisis. 
Shadow banking has a long history37 but was largely dormant for 
most of the Quiet Period.38 In the two decades leading up to the crisis of 
2007–2009, however, shadow banking metastasized until it was as large as 
or larger than the chartered banking system on the eve of the crisis.39 
Prominent examples of shadow banks include money market funds40 and 
broker-dealers funding themselves with commercial paper and repo 
loans.41 Just as depository institutions were vulnerable to crises prior to 
the establishment of the federal safety net, so shadow banks, without that 
safety net, proved similarly vulnerable. Previous financial crises in the 
United States were characterized by runs on banks; the crisis in 2007 and 
                                                                                                                           
 35. An example of such a deposit substitute is the repurchase agreement, or “repo 
loan,” in which, for example, a money market fund makes a short-term loan—often 
overnight—to a broker-dealer and receives collateral in return. The cash lender in this 
case is the functional equivalent of a depositor, with a daily option not to roll over its 
loan—that is, to withdraw its funding. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, The Shadow 
Banking System: Implications for Financial Regulation 8 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff 
Report No. 382, 2009), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr382.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Y7WU-XUXY] (“In a repo, the borrower sells a security today for a 
price below the current market price on the understanding that it will buy it back in the 
future at a pre-agreed price.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Ricks, The Money Problem, supra note 10, at ix (“To [the Crisis 
Response Team at the U.S. Treasury, “shadow banking”] meant something . . . quite 
specific. When we talked about shadow banking, we were referring to the financial sector’s 
use of vast amounts of short-term debt to fund portfolios of financial assets.”). 
 37. Id. at 230–37.  
 38. See, e.g., Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking 
System, Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, Fall 2010, at 261, 265 fig.3, http://www. 
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/2010b_bpea_gorton.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
A4AH-X8ZZ]. 
 39. Id.; see also Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking 8 fig.1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. 
Staff Report No. 458, 2010), http://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/ 
staff_reports/sr458.pdf [http://perma.cc/2T2E-JVCX]. 
 40. A money market fund offers investors “shares” that have traditionally maintained 
a stable value of $1.00 and invests in a variety of instruments of short- to medium-term 
maturity and low credit risk. The shares are redeemable on demand and function as close 
substitutes for deposits for the money market fund investors. See Money Market Funds, 
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfmmkt.htm [http://perma.cc/RK4D-BBXW] (last 
updated Jan. 17, 2017). 
 41. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 38, at 261–62. For a description of repo loans, see 
supra note 35. 
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2008 was at core a run on shadow banks.42 Structurally, it was like the 
earlier bank runs, but it manifested itself in a different institutional 
setting: Instead of depositors lining up to make withdrawals from banks, 
as during the early 1930s, large institutional investors decided en masse 
not to roll over their short-term loans to broker-dealers, such as Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers, and redeemed their “shares” in money 
market funds.43 
Ultimately, regulators were able to halt the panic by (among other 
measures) extending the safety net to shadow banks.44 Of course, part of 
the deal with commercial banks is that while they benefit from the safety 
net, they must submit to (often onerous) prudential rules and 
supervision. The fact that shadow banks received safety-net support 
without striking such a deal struck many as problematic. In the wake of 
the crisis and the bailouts, one approach to the problem of shadow 
banking would have been to try to stamp it out.45 Indeed, there is reason 
to believe this would be the best approach, but it has little, if any, political 
traction. As long as shadow banking exists, then the best way to mitigate 
the inevitable fragility it creates is to apply as much of the banking 
regulatory approach to it as possible. 
D. Post-Crisis Reforms 
Post-crisis reforms have been a mixed bag in addressing the shadow 
banking system. On the one hand, Congress limited or removed 
regulators’ authority to extend the safety net outside the traditional 
banking system.46 On the other hand, the largest broker-dealers, a major 
locus of shadow banking activity, are all now housed within bank holding 
companies (BHCs).47 While these broker-dealers continue to be reg-
ulated by the SEC under a primarily “capital markets” approach, the 
Federal Reserve regulates holding companies on a consolidated basis, so 
there is a degree of prudential regulation that applies to the broker-
                                                                                                                           
 42. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 38, at 279–80. 
 43. See Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, supra note 16, at 280, 324, 363. For an 
explanation of money market fund shares, see supra note 40. 
 44. See Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Financial Crisis Manual: A Guide to the Laws, 




 45. See generally Ricks, The Money Problem, supra note 10 (arguing short-term 
funding markets were the central problem to the financial system). 
 46. See Crawford, The Moral Hazard Paradox, supra note 26, at 97 n.8, 121. 
 47. A BHC can own both banks and nonbank subsidiaries, such as broker-dealers or 
asset managers. At the beginning of 2008, there were five large stand-alone investment 
banks that were not housed in BHCs. Of these, one (Lehman Brothers) failed, Fin. Crisis 
Inquiry Comm’n, supra note 16, at 324–44, two (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch) were 
bought by large BHCs, id. at 353–88, and two (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) 
converted into BHCs, id. 
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dealers as well.48 Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act established a special 
“liquidation authority” to try to facilitate winding down a giant 
nondepository financial institution (such as a BHC) without creating 
significant negative systemic externalities.49 In sum, as former Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner has argued, there is less “dry tinder” in the 
system, but the tools available to policymakers to respond to a crisis if 
one occurs have, on net, been diminished.50 This should be a source of 
concern, as shadow banking still thrives. Even if capital levels are higher 
and short-term funding levels have declined slightly since 2008, there are 
still trillions of dollars of uninsured deposit-like claims on institutions, 
such as broker-dealers and money market funds, that remain outside the 
safety net and that are subject to varying degrees of prudential regulation 
(if any).51 
II. THE PATH AHEAD: THE IMPACT OF PROPOSED REFORMS ON FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 
The thesis of this Piece is that the key to financial stability is to apply 
the banking regulatory approach to institutions and activities that 
function like banks. For those that do not function like banks—that is, for 
firms that are not vulnerable to runs—the capital markets approach is 
entirely appropriate. Based on key provisions of the CHOICE Act, 
however, there is reason to believe that legislative efforts in the coming 
year(s) will move in the wrong direction on this front. 
                                                                                                                           
 48. See generally Div. of Banking Supervision & Regulation, Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys., Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual (2016), http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/bhc/bhc.pdf [http://perma.cc/KT3X-YUPF] 
(providing guidance for regulating bank holding companies). For example, a BHC has to 
meet capital requirements not just in its bank subsidiary but on a consolidated basis for 
the entire holding company family. Id. § 4061.0; see also Geithner, Are We Safe Yet?, supra 
note 17 (“Perhaps as important as the fact that capital requirements have grown in size is 
that they now apply more widely . . . . Today, the largest investment banks are regulated as 
bank holding companies, subjecting entire institutions to higher capital requirements.”). 
It is important to note, however, that the broker-dealer does not enjoy automatic 
access to the federal safety net—emergency lending by the Federal Reserve and deposit 
insurance—as does the commercial bank that sits in the same holding company family. See 
12 U.S.C. § 378 (2012) (prohibiting securities dealers from engaging in banking business); 
What’s Covered, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/covered/ [http://perma.cc/QPM7-
DZ9M] (last updated Jan. 6, 2017); The Federal Reserve Discount Window, 
http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/Pages/General-Information/The-Discount-
Window.aspx [http://perma.cc/PG9E-R5DZ] (last updated June 22, 2015). 
 49. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394. 
 50. Geithner, Are We Safe Yet?, supra note 17 (describing constraints on fiscal and 
monetary policy in the current environment as well as a decrease in “fire-fighting” tools). 
 51. Id. (describing higher capital levels and decreased reliance on uninsured short-
term funding in the financial system); Volcker Alliance Report, supra note 10, at 14 fig.1 
(measuring uninsured short-term debt in the financial system). 
2017] LESSON UNLEARNED? 137 
 
A. The Financial Stability Oversight Council 
Two key lessons of the financial crisis were that large gaps existed in 
our financial regulatory structure and that no entity was responsible for 
monitoring risks to the stability of the system as a whole. As a result, the 
Dodd-Frank Act created the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC), composed of the heads of all the federal financial regulatory 
agencies and chaired by the Treasury Secretary.52 The FSOC is 
responsible for monitoring risk throughout the financial system. The 
principal new authority the FSOC wields is the power to designate 
financial institutions that are neither banks nor BHCs (both of which are 
already prudentially regulated) as “systemically important,” thereby 
subjecting them to prudential oversight by the Federal Reserve.53 
This is important because some large nonbanks engage in extensive 
shadow banking activities. For example, MetLife, an insurance company 
that has been designated as systemically important by the FSOC but that 
has fought this designation,54 funds itself with billions of dollars in short-
term debt—that is, with deposit substitutes.55 If MetLife’s short-term 
creditors refused en masse to roll over their loans, it would be 
functionally identical to, and create the risk of the same awful 
externalities as, a traditional bank run. Indeed, if one understands why 
banks demand a special regulatory response, it is hard to justify the lack 
of such a regulatory response to a firm such as MetLife that engages so 
extensively in shadow banking. 
While the number of major firms engaged in shadow banking outside 
of BHCs may be limited today, that can change rapidly, just as it did in 
the decade or two leading up to the crisis. FSOC designation is the only 
tool we have to ensure that some measure of prudential regulation is 
applied to nonbanks engaged in shadow banking. 
The FSOC is thus an essential component of post-2008 financial 
reform and plays a crucial role in maintaining systemic stability, 
particularly as market actors adjust their activities to try to evade 
regulation. Yet Republicans have expressed a good deal of hostility to the 
FSOC,56 and the CHOICE Act would eliminate the FSOC’s designation 
                                                                                                                           
 52. 12 U.S.C. § 5321. 
 53. Id. § 5323. 
 54. See Ryan Tracy, MetLife Asks Appeals Court to Uphold Removal of ‘SIFI’ Label, 
Wall St. J. (Aug. 16, 2016, 10:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/metlife-asks-appeals-
court-to-uphold-removal-of-sifi-label-1471355267 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 55. See Brief of Professors of Law & Finance as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant at 
14–15, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(No. 15-cv-00045-RMC), 2015 WL 3422509 (“Even more striking than the aggregate size of 
MetLife’s debt is that MetLife finances so much of its activities through short-term 
borrowing that must be repaid or refinanced in the near term.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Max Abelson & Zachary Tracer, SEC’s Piwowar Calls FSOC ‘Vast Left-
Wing Conspiracy,’ Bloomberg News (July 16, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/2014-07-15/sec-s-piwowar-calls-fsoc-vast-left-wing-conspiracy-.html [http://perma. 
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authority.57 Representative Hensarling stated recently that by “empowering 
the FSOC to designate [systemically important financial institutions], the 
Dodd-Frank Act allows the Federal Reserve to impose bank-like standards 
on nonbank institutions; in other words, to move institutions from the 
non-bailout economy to the bailout economy.”58 Alas, it is not 
designation that moves an institution into the “bailout” economy:59 It is 
engaging in bank-like activities such that a run on the institution (and/or 
its failure) creates potentially catastrophic costs for the financial system. 
Designation does nothing to increase the powers of regulators to “bail 
out” a firm; it simply empowers regulators to compel shadow banks to 
operate in a way that makes their failure less likely. The incentive to “bail 
out” a firm is identical whether or not the firm has been designated. 
In short, repeal of the FSOC’s designation authority is high on the 
priority list of influential Republicans but is grounded in a confused and 
rigidly formalistic conception about which entities demand a banking 
regulatory approach. Repealing this authority will have a potentially 
significant destabilizing effect on the financial system in coming years. 
B. Emergency Response Tools: Lending and Guarantee Authorities 
As noted, Congress has already acted to limit regulators’ firefighting 
tools in the years since the crisis: It has placed restrictions on the Federal 
Reserve’s emergency lending authorities and eliminated the freestanding 
guarantee authorities regulators used to limit the financial wildfire in late 
2008.60 The CHOICE Act would further tie regulators’ hands in 
responding to a crisis.61 The desire to tie regulators’ hands reflects a view 
                                                                                                                           
cc/KT6J-ZBPD] (reporting Republican SEC Commissioner Michael Piwowar’s comments 
that the FSOC’s “initials really stand for ‘Firing Squad on Capitalism,’” and that the 
Council is a “vast left-wing conspiracy to hinder capital formation,” “[t]he Bully Pulpit of 
Failed Prudential Regulators,” and “[t]he Dodd-Frank Politburo”); Tracy, A Financial 
Council Republicans Loathe, supra note 8 (describing one of the members of President 
Trump’s FSOC transition team as executive director of “an advocacy group whose website 
calls FSOC a ‘rogue regulator’ and asks readers to ‘Sock Back at FSOC’ by telling Congress 
to curtail its power or abolish it”). 
 57. Financial CHOICE Act, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. § 211 (2016). 
 58. Press Release, Fin. Servs. Comm., Chairman Hensarling Once Again Calls on 
FSOC to ‘Cease and Desist’ Too-Big-to-Fail Designations Until Questions Are Answered 
(May 20, 2014), http://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID= 
380567 [http://perma.cc/4NCG-8G8N]. 
 59. “Bailout” in this context means government support to prevent a firm from 
defaulting on its debt obligations. 
 60. See supra text accompanying note 46. 
 61. H.R. 5983 §§ 243, 707. Perhaps most disturbingly, it would eliminate the statutory 
provision providing a “systemic risk exception” to the requirement that the FDIC adopt 
the “least cost” approach to resolving a bank. Id. § 242. Normally, the “least cost” 
requirement means that the FDIC cannot protect uninsured creditors of a failed bank. See 
12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2012). The systemic risk exception provides a way for it to do 
so anyway if the majority of the FDIC Board and of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve and the Treasury Secretary all concur that doing so is necessary to preserve the 
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that we should leave shadow banks entirely to the market, that the moral 
hazard arising out of panic prevention in the shadow banking sector will 
prove more costly than the fallout from the crises when they occur. 
Again, this Piece argues that this view is wrong as applied to banks.62 If 
one accepts that it is wrong as applied to banks, it is (again) hard to 
justify adopting such a view with respect to shadow banks. As Secretary 
Geithner wrote in his memoir, such an approach is like “[t]aking away 
the fire department’s equipment”—it “ensures that the equipment won’t 
be used but it isn’t much of a strategy for reducing fire damage.”63 Of 
course, it is important to emphasize that emergency response tools and 
safety nets must be coupled with prudential rules and supervisory 
authority to mitigate moral hazard: This is the basic logic of the banking 
approach to regulation. 
C. Resolution 
Another key aspect of the CHOICE Act addresses what to do with 
failing financial behemoths. Putting a bank through bankruptcy would 
be extremely disruptive, because bankruptcy is slow, and depositors, 
unlike typical bondholders or equity claimants, need immediate access to 
their accounts.64 Without such immediate access, there may be significant 
consequential damages for the depositors irrespective of any investment 
losses,65 and runs are more likely to spread to sister banks—a sort of con-
tagion by simile.66 A key to the banking approach to regulation, then, is 
providing a resolution mechanism that allows depositors of a failed bank 
to get immediate access to their money. One of the reasons the failure of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was so disruptive is that many of its 
short-term creditors were treating their claims on it like deposits—
                                                                                                                           
financial stability of the United States. See id. This provision played a critical role in 
preventing an all-out collapse of the system in late 2008. See Crawford, The Moral Hazard 
Paradox, supra note 26, at 114–15. Proposing its elimination evinces what Secretary 
Geithner has called “moral hazard fundamentalism”—that is, a desire to constrain moral 
hazard not as a means to an end (a robust financial system and healthy economy) but as 
an end in itself. Cf. Timothy F. Geithner, Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crises 178 
(2015) [hereinafter Geithner, Stress Test] (noting the government’s desire not “to bolster 
the impression that government handouts were available upon request”). 
 62. Some commentators disagree and believe that the effects of deposit insurance are 
pernicious. See, e.g., Charles Calomiris & Matthew Jaremski, Deposit Insurance: Theories 
and Facts (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22223, 2016), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22223 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). This Piece 
argues that this view is wrong, though it has the virtue of being more coherent than the 
competing view that the banking regulatory approach should be adopted for banks but 
not shadow banks. 
 63. Geithner, Stress Test, supra note 61, at 430. 
 64. See Crawford, Credible Losers, supra note 11, at 135–36. 
 65. See Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, supra note 15, at 83. 
 66. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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making Lehman a large shadow bank—but there was no special 
mechanism available to unwind it.67 
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act was crafted to respond to this 
problem: The “orderly liquidation authority” empowered the FDIC—
after an invocation procedure that, like the systemic risk exception 
discussed above, requires the concurrence of the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve and the Secretary of the Treasury—to resolve 
nonbanks in a process intended to mirror the bank resolution process.68 
The CHOICE Act would repeal Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and 
replace it with a new subchapter of the Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 11, 
Subchapter V (Subchapter V).69 Many of the provisions of Subchapter V 
appear to mimic the best features of the Dodd-Frank Act. There are, 
however, at least two significant disadvantages of Subchapter V vis-à-vis 
Title II from a financial-stability perspective. First, the CHOICE Act 
would not permit regulators to trigger a Subchapter V bankruptcy 
filing.70 As Professors Mark Roe and David Skeel argue, 
If the regulators think that a bankruptcy is needed, but that a 
bailout or alternative resolution process is not needed, they 
cannot directly force a filing. . . . 
True, regulators can pressure bank managers to reluctantly 
file, but the regulators may have to concede conditions to bank 
executives to make them file quickly; if the bank does not file 
quickly, the regulators may decide that to save the economy, 
they have to bail the bank out. In the extreme case, bank 
management may just refuse to file for bankruptcy.71 
Second, while Title II can be invoked for any nondepository 
financial company,72 Subchapter V would be available for a narrower 
category of firms.73 This leaves open the possibility that significant 
shadow banks that do not fit under the narrower definition of “covered 
financial company” would have only the preexisting provisions of the 
                                                                                                                           
 67. Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, supra note 16, at 324–43. 
 68. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394 (2012). For an analysis of plans that regulators have 
developed to implement Title II, see generally Crawford, Credible Losers, supra note 11, 
at 137–47. 
 69. Financial CHOICE Act, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. §§ 1181–1192 (2016). 
 70. Id. § 232 (revising Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code). 
 71. Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy for Banks: A Sound Concept that 
Needs Fine-Tuning, N.Y. Times: DealBook (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2016/08/17/business/dealbook/bankruptcy-for-banks-a-sound-concept-that-needs-
fine-tuning.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (critiquing a stand-alone version of 
this bankruptcy reform that had made its way into an appropriations bill). 
 72. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381(a)(8), 5383. Depository institutions are excluded, of course, 
because they are already subject to a special resolution regime. 
 73. H.R. 5983 § 231(a) (defining “covered financial corporations” as comprising only 
(i) BHCs or (ii) other large holding companies that “exist[] for the primary purpose of 
owning, controlling and financing [their] subsidiaries” but excluding stockbrokers and 
commodity brokers). 
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Bankruptcy Code as a resolution option going forward, recreating the 
very problem that Title II of Dodd-Frank was written to solve.74 Again, 
then, the CHOICE Act evinces a failure of imagination and under-
standing in grasping the core problem of financial stability: bank-like 
functions and risks that lie in the regulatory shadows. 
D.  Capital 
One of the key ingredients of prudential regulation is capital 
requirements. Capital is a measure of the difference between what a bank 
owns (its assets) and what it owes (its debts).75 The thicker a bank’s 
capital buffer, the more losses it can absorb before tipping into 
insolvency. Leading up to the crisis, the nation’s shadow banks—
particularly broker-dealers funding themselves with short-term debt—
were operating with capital buffers that were razor thin.76 One of the 
more intriguing provisions of the CHOICE Act would permit banks and 
BHCs that meet a 10% leverage ratio—equivalent to a capital buffer of 
10% of a firm’s total assets77—to be relieved of a wide array of other 
prudential regulations.78 The provision seems to hinge on a belief that 
with higher capital in place, we can relax about the risk of panics and 
allow a capital markets approach to govern. There are several problems 
with this view. First, while it is true that higher capital requirements are 
better for stability if all else is equal, all else is not equal here. Because a 
firm opting into this regime would, for example, be relieved of meeting 
risk-based capital requirements, we should expect such firms to migrate to 
a much riskier portfolio of assets.79 It is not clear that a firm with a 10% 
leverage ratio but holding risky assets is less likely to fail or to create 
systemic knock-on effects than a firm with a 5% leverage ratio holding 
primarily “safe” assets. 
                                                                                                                           
 74. The problem with the CHOICE Act’s definition is not that there are lots of 
shadow banks that would fail to fit within it right now but rather that shadow banking can 
shift to forms that do not rely on the holding company structures that are Subchapter V’s 
focus. 
 75. Note that this is distinct from reserve requirements, which mandate that banks 
hold a certain percentage of their deposit base in cash (or as deposits with the Federal 
Reserve). Capital requirements have nothing to do with how much cash a bank holds; 
rather, they have to do with how much debt a bank can take on relative to equity. Bank 
capital requirements are extremely complicated in detail, see 12 C.F.R. § 3.10 (2016), but 
straightforward conceptually. See Carnell et al., supra note 12, at 217–18 (distinguishing 
different usages of “capital” from the usage in bank regulation). See generally Anat 
Admati & Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes (2013) (providing a lucid conceptual 
account of bank capital). 
 76. Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, supra note 16, at xix. 
 77. For every $10 in assets, then, the firm would have $1 in capital to absorb losses. 
 78. H.R. 5983 §§ 101–102. 
 79. Id. § 102. Banks currently have to meet both risk-based requirements and a 
(lower) leverage ratio that is unadjusted for risk—a sort of belt-and-suspenders approach 
to capital regulation. 12 U.S.C. § 5371 (2012). 
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More fundamentally, capital requirements are an extremely clumsy 
and unreliable tool on their own for preventing panics. In the era prior to 
the development of the federal safety net, bank capital levels were 
significantly higher than 10%, but runs and panics occurred every decade 
or two.80 Although there must be a point at which higher capital would 
“solve” the problem of financial crises—at the limit, one could force all 
intermediation to be funded with 100% equity and all deposit-taking 
institutions to hold 100% reserves81—there is no proposal with any 
political traction that comes close to such a level.82 
To be sure, the current combination of capital, liquidity, and other 
prudential standards as applied to BHCs (which house a large portion of 
the shadow banking industry in their nondeposit subsidiaries) does not 
“panic-proof” the system, even as it marks an improvement over a laissez 
faire approach.83 Perhaps trading higher capital for scaled-back reg-
ulation in other areas will get us a similar degree of protection for lower 
cost. Perhaps not. Either way, its effect on financial stability is likely to be 
small relative to the risks we face, and the provision (again) betrays a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of those risks. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States remains vulnerable to financial crises and the 
terrible economic damage they cause. The first and most critical step to 
ameliorating this problem is to grasp that it is banks’ economic function 
rather than legal form that demands a special regulatory response. That 
economic function—funding long-term investments with large amounts 
of short-term debt—is valuable but can impose appalling costs on the 
real economy when left solely to the discipline of market forces. The 
United States largely solved this problem with respect to legal depos-
itories, allowing banks’ valuable economic functions to thrive while 
containing the cost through the combination of a safety net and safety-
and-soundness regulation. We have extended only pieces of this 
approach to shadow banks. Greater stability requires either suppressing 
                                                                                                                           
 80. On bank capital levels in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, see 
Admati & Hellwig, supra note 75, at 30–31. On the frequency of financial crises in this era, 
see supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 81. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 357, 360 (2016) (proposing full reserve banking). 
 82. Professor Anat Admati is perhaps the most prominent advocate for higher capital 
levels, proposing leverage ratios in the range of 20–30%. See Admati & Hellwig, supra note 
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prudential supervision. See generally Ricks, Safety First?, supra note 21. 
 83. This is a function of the continuing existence of trillions of dollars in runnable 
funding outside the safety net. See Volcker Alliance Report, supra note 10, at 21; Geithner, 
Are We Safe Yet?, supra note 17. 
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shadow banks altogether or applying the banking regulatory approach 
more completely to them. A key criterion for judging financial reform 
efforts in the new Administration will be whether they move us further 
from this end or closer to it. 
